Fungible Space: Competition and Volatility in the Global Logistics Network by Danyluk, Martin
Fungible Space: 




Department of Geography 
University of British Columbia 
1984 West Mall 




Forthcoming in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT—NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION 
Abstract 
This paper examines an emerging form of interspatial competition premised on attract-
ing cargo traffic and value-added logistics activities. Against the backdrop of economic 
globalization and the revolution in logistics, place-based actors are increasingly vying to 
insert their localities into transnational supply chains. I explore the causes, conditions, 
and consequences of this burgeoning growth strategy through a study of the dynamics 
surrounding the expansion of the Panama Canal, opened to shipping traffic in June 
2016, and the consequent battle among North American ports to attract a new genera-
tion of oversized container vessels. The spatial practices of mobile actors in the logistics 
industry, I argue, represent the leading edge of capitalism’s tendency to render places 
interchangeable—a condition I call fungible space. The abstract logic of spatial substi-
tution, however, can never fully escape the concrete qualities of particular places, which 
form its very conditions of possibility. This dialectic of spatial fungibility and geographic 
specificity has intensified rivalries for volatile commodity flows and made logistics-ori-
ented development a particularly risky growth strategy for cities. At stake in these spec-
ulative ventures is the welfare of vulnerable communities and workers who dispropor-
tionately bear the costs and risks of supply-chain volatility. 
Keywords 




Figure 1 shows a map published in 2014 by Maersk Line, the world’s largest container-
shipping company, providing schedule and route information for one of its transpacific 
eastbound services between Asia and North America. A careful look at the image reveals 
something peculiar: the route depicted on the map is neither transpacific nor eastbound. 
After departing from eastern China, ships deployed on Maersk’s TP11 circuit sail west 
across the Indian Ocean, through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, and across the 
Atlantic to Newark, New Jersey. 
How to make sense of this incongruous image? The immediate explanation is 
straightforward. Until recently, most ships carrying containerized cargo between Asia 
and the US East Coast did indeed travel across the Pacific, reaching the Eastern Seaboard 
by way of the Panama Canal. In 2013, though, Maersk Line and other ocean carriers 
began diverting some of this freight through the wider, deeper Suez Canal instead, al-
Figure 1. Maersk Line’s Transpacific 11 Eastbound container service, 2014. Source: Maersk Group 
(2014) Routenet. URL http://www.maerskline.com/en-us/shipping-services/routenet/maersk-line-net-
work/overview (accessed 30 December 2014). 
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lowing them to use larger, more fuel-efficient vessels (Park, 2013). The label “transpa-
cific” is a remnant of earlier shipping patterns, presumably retained by Maersk Line in 
order not to confuse its customers. 
For urbanists and geographers, however, Maersk’s routing decision and the associ-
ated map, in which an entire ocean has been replaced by another without comment, 
raise provocative questions. What has made it possible for places—port cities, shipping 
lanes, even whole expanses of sea—to be so readily substituted within the circuits of 
commodity capital? What forces are driving such drastic spatial transpositions? And 
what is at stake? These questions are closely related to another recent trend: the embrace 
of the logistics industry as an engine of place-based economic development and an object 
of interspatial competition. Over the past two decades, efforts to attract cargo traffic 
and value-added logistics activities have played an increasingly pronounced role in en-
trepreneurial growth strategies at the local, regional, and national scales. Yet, with only 
a few exceptions (Jaffee, 2015; Negrey et al., 2011; Wachsmuth, 2017), this develop-
ment has received little attention in urban scholarship. 
This paper probes the relationship between these two phenomena—the increasing 
substitutability of places within corporate supply chains and the intensification of com-
petition among localities for commodity flows—through a multisited study of the con-
tainer-shipping industry. It centers on the expansion of the Panama Canal, opened to 
shipping traffic in June 2016, and the consequent battle among North American ports 
to attract the new generation of oversized container vessels that can now use the water-
way. As I show, recent developments in logistics have greatly enhanced the mobility of 
cargo, along with the ability of footloose industry actors to reshape their production 
and distribution networks. This newfound geographic flexibility has been actively ex-
ploited by manufacturers, retailers, and transportation providers seeking to drive down 
shipping costs and secure a wide range of routing options. The spatial practices of mo-
bile actors in the logistics industry, I argue, represent the leading edge of capitalism’s 
tendency to render places interchangeable—a condition I call fungible space. 
Yet the abstract logic of spatial substitution can never fully escape the concrete qual-
ities of particular places—qualities that form its very conditions of possibility. This dia-
lectic of spatial fungibility and geographic specificity has intensified rivalries among 
places to attract volatile cargo flows and made logistics-oriented development an espe-
cially risky strategy for local officials and elites seeking to promote economic growth. 
At stake in these competitive ventures is the welfare of the communities and workers 
who live and labor in the arteries of global trade, as the costs and risks of supply-chain 
volatility are disproportionately borne by the most vulnerable actors in the network. 
The article draws on a year of fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 2014 in Pan-
ama City, Los Angeles, and New York—three of the busiest container ports in the Amer-
icas—examining how actors in each region have been affected by and responded to the 
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Panama Canal expansion. The research consisted of 73 semistructured interviews with 
industry, government, and community representatives; analysis of media coverage, pol-
icy and planning reports, and industry periodicals; participant observation within com-
munity-based organizations contending with the local impacts of freight movement; and 
nonparticipant observation at logistics industry conferences and trade fairs. The study’s 
multisited research design instantiates what Ward (2010) calls a “relational compara-
tive” approach to urban studies (see also Hart, 2006, 2016), making it possible not only 
to draw comparisons among the different study areas but also to trace the flows and 
connections that bind them together. The three port regions examined here are ap-
proached not as discrete individual cases but as interrelated nodes in a shifting global 
network. 
The paper is divided into four parts. The first section provides an overview of the 
rise of logistics-oriented economic development schemes, contextualizing this emerging 
growth strategy in relation to the literature on entrepreneurial urbanism. The second 
section introduces the concept of fungible space. Building on Lefebvre’s notion of ab-
stract space, I argue that the historical development of capitalism is characterized by a 
tendency toward increasingly frequent and large-scale spatial substitutions. This trend 
is especially pronounced in the logistics industry, where recent developments have aug-
mented the interchangeability of nodes and paths within global commodity circuits. In 
the next two parts, I explore these dynamics in action through the case of the Panama 
Canal expansion. The third section outlines the implications of the canal project for 
container flows and discusses the entrepreneurial strategies that logistics interests in 
Panama and North America have pursued to attract cargo traffic to their jurisdictions. 
Militating against any simplistic conception of fungible space, however, the fourth sec-
tion shows that the very possibility of rendering places interchangeable is contingent on 
particular geographical conditions whose realization requires ongoing work. I also high-
light the power of local political opposition to influence the shape of the wider network. 
Finally, in the conclusion, I consider some of the implications of logistics-based compe-
tition in an age of increasingly fungible space and increasingly volatile supply chains—
both for the place-based elites who seek to expand the throughput of the cargo network 
and for the populations who live and work in its paths. 
Competition for Cargo 
Scholars of cities are now well acquainted with the idea of entrepreneurial urbanism. 
Since the 1970s, urban and regional governance has become preoccupied with the goal 
of fostering economic development through attracting mobile capital investment (Hall 
and Hubbard, 1998; Brenner, 2003). As Harvey (1989: 4) observed in his seminal essay 
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on the phenomenon, local governments in advanced capitalist countries have increas-
ingly come to regard themselves as competitive actors and, accordingly, shifted their 
policy orientation from a “managerial” stance focused on the provision of local services 
and benefits to an “entrepreneurial” one emphasizing the creation of a friendly business 
climate. This changing approach to urban governance brings with it new political for-
mations. Logan and Molotch (1987), in their theorization of the city as a growth ma-
chine, describe the influential role in shaping urban policy played by what they call 
“growth coalitions”: alliances of place-based elites seeking to defend or enhance the 
value of geographically immobile assets (see also Molotch, 1976; Jonas and Wilson, 
1999). The paradigmatic standard bearers of the urban growth coalition are represent-
atives of the local rentier class—development, real estate, and construction interests—
but members may also include municipal governments, business associations, local me-
dia outlets, and labor unions. What unites these otherwise disparate actors is a shared 
interest in driving local economic growth through land-use intensification. 
The entrepreneurial orientation of the urban growth machine is structured by, and 
itself serves to sustain, a wider field of interurban competition. That competitive logic is 
self-reinforcing: the more places that enter the race to attract footloose businesses and 
jobs, the more they indirectly enhance the relative power of mobile capital by providing 
it with an expanding menu of location options. “In selling themselves,” Peck and Tickell 
(2002: 393) write, “cities are therefore actively facilitating and subsidizing the very ge-
ographic mobility that first rendered them vulnerable. . . . The logic of interurban com-
petition, then, turns cities into accomplices in their own subordination.” In this way, the 
doctrine of urban entrepreneurialism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: the collective 
decision to engage in the game—and to believe it is worth engaging in—is precisely what 
brings the contest into existence and guarantees its perpetuation. 
In his prescient diagnosis, Harvey (1989) posited that urban entrepreneurial schemes 
have four basic options available to them: cities may attempt to attract production ac-
tivities, consumer spending, command-and-control functions, or redistributions from 
upper levels of government. Harvey’s typology is complicated, however, by the global 
restructuring of capitalist activity that began in the 1970s and the concomitant rise of 
the field of business logistics. By “stretching the factory” (Cowen, 2014: 102) across 
planetary space, the logistics revolution has facilitated the development of a global cir-
culatory system in which production and distribution, previously regarded as two dis-
crete phases in a linear sequence of activities, are now densely interwoven. This func-
tional and spatial reorganization of the supply chain has given rise to a new variation 
on the urban growth strategy in which the aim is not to entice investment into a locality 
but to redirect the flow of commodities through it. As Cowen (2014: 72) observes: “It 
is the activity of goods movement that is coveted, regardless of the final destination of 
the goods. . . . Logistics—the management of supply chains—is a booming industry in 
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itself with value added and spin-off economic activity.” For local governments, busi-
nesses, and workers, the economic benefits to be had from increased cargo traffic include 
the jobs associated with moving, storing, processing, packaging, labeling, redirecting, 
and assembling goods, as well as the profits and tax revenues deriving from those activ-
ities and associated multiplier effects. 
The embrace of logistics as a motor of economic growth can be attributed to two 
broad and interrelated shifts in capitalist organization since the 1970s. The first is the 
globalization of production. Offshoring and the global extension of supply chains have 
elevated the importance of physical circulation within the overall accumulation of cap-
ital. As corporate profits have come to depend on the rapid, efficient, just-in-time move-
ment of raw materials, parts, and finished goods across vast distances, the logistics sec-
tor has become a key target of schemes to foster local economic development. This is 
especially the case in regions like North America and western Europe, which have expe-
rienced a loss of manufacturing jobs—in part a result of the same forces of global dis-
persal—and where policy makers are now seeking to promote alternative sources of 
employment (De Lara, 2012). A second driver of entrepreneurial efforts to attract cargo 
traffic is the wave of technological and organizational change known as the logistics 
revolution (see Allen, 1997; Bonacich and Wilson, 2008; Cowen, 2014). Since the 
1960s, new technologies, management approaches, and business practices have greatly 
reduced the spatial constraints on transportation and distribution activities, enhancing 
the mobility of cargo. In turn, this newfound flexibility of corporate supply chains has 
intensified rivalries among places for footloose commodity flows. 
Like conventional growth strategies, logistics-oriented development schemes are typ-
ically pursued through public-private partnerships involving an array of geographically 
situated actors, such as local and state governments, seaport and airport authorities, 
railroads, local business associations, labor organizations, and construction and real es-
tate interests. Jaffee (2015) usefully distinguishes between those stakeholders with a spe-
cific interest in the growth of the goods-movement sector (e.g., trucking companies, 
warehouse developers, construction firms likely to benefit from infrastructure invest-
ment) and those whose interests are more diffusely tied to local economic expansion in 
general (e.g., the municipal chamber of commerce). While entrepreneurial initiatives to 
attract cargo flows are frequently organized at the urban scale, the expansive geogra-
phies of supply chains frequently necessitate the involvement of supralocal actors as 
well. In the United States, large-scale infrastructure projects often hinge on investment 
from upper levels of government, meaning that logistics-based growth efforts tend to be 
coordinated across some larger area, such as the metropolis, corridor, or state 
(Wachsmuth, 2017). Elsewhere, the circulation of commodities has become a national-
scale concern. Several fast-growing countries, including China, have placed logistics at 
the center of their economic development strategies (Sowers et al., 2014). National 
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states’ growing preoccupation with goods movement is evinced in—and has been fueled 
by—a recently devised World Bank ranking called the Logistics Performance Index, 
which compares countries in terms of infrastructure, customs processes, logistics ser-
vices, tracking and tracing capabilities, timeliness, and ease of arranging shipments. The 
index, updated biannually, has prompted numerous countries to make investments in 
order to improve their logistics competitiveness (Cowen, 2014). 
In important ways, then, logistics-oriented development schemes resemble growth 
strategies aimed at attracting more traditional production or consumption activities. 
One feature that distinguishes this emerging form of boosterism, however, is the intrin-
sically networked character of the activity being sought out, which makes possible com-
plex relations of geographic interconnection and transposition. In the next section, I 
explore how recent developments in logistics have both enabled and impelled the sub-
stitution of places within the supply chain. 
Abstraction and Fungibility in the Global Logistics Network 
The increasing ease with which one locality may be swapped out for another within 
global commodity circuits is one manifestation of capitalism’s propensity to remake 
space in ways that abstract from the concrete properties of particular places. Lefebvre 
(1991) viewed the proliferation of such an “abstract space” as a hallmark of capitalist 
modernity. Through the material and discursive practices of diverse social actors, he 
wrote, capitalism “tends to produce a space of its own,” a distinctive geography fash-
ioned by “abolishing spatial and temporal differences” and “destroying nature and na-
ture’s time” (326). Lefebvre believed that the worldwide extension of abstract space had 
become vital to the survival of capitalism during the twentieth century. The continued 
accumulation of capital and the reproduction of capitalist social relations, he claimed, 
were predicated on the production of an increasingly instrumental and all-embracing 
spatiality. 
Abstract space, as Lefebvre saw it, serves two functions for capital. The first is to 
facilitate the production, circulation, and realization of surplus value. This implies, 
among other things, the perpetual reconfiguration of spatial relationships so as to pro-
mote corporate profitability. The exchange relations presupposed by money are “pro-
jected onto the terrain in the shape of relational networks (communications, markets) 
and of hierarchically organized centres (towns)” (Lefebvre, 1991: 120). Accordingly, in 
today’s global economy—characterized by intensive and extensive flows of goods, ma-
terials, people, and information—the ongoing accumulation of capital implies the pro-
duction of a dense planetary matrix of transportation and communication infrastruc-
ture, including an integrated logistics system to regularize the circulation of commodities 
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(Danyluk, 2017). Lefebvre explicitly connected the distinctive spatiality of late capital-
ism with processes of logistical calculation. “The production of space,” he wrote, “is 
thought of in terms of logic or logistics. ‘Space’ seems to have a rational character, an 
implicit coherence which in turn implies practical cohesion” (Lefebvre, 1976: 27). Ab-
stract space not only promotes ambient processes of production, distribution, and con-
sumption; in its second function, it is also itself transformed into a commodity, and 
produced, distributed, and consumed as such (Stanek, 2011). Lefebvre was especially 
interested in the dynamics of urbanization, through which individual pieces of space are 
enrolled in the circulation of capital via processes of market exchange, profit-oriented 
development, and real estate speculation. 
To serve its dual role as facilitator and object of accumulation, space must be sub-
jected to systems of representation and procedures that allow it to be quantified—di-
vided, measured, and compared with other pieces of space according to universal stand-
ards (Stanek, 2011). Just as Marx’s concept of abstract labor designated those aspects 
of human productive activity that make the products of different acts of concrete labor 
commensurable and therefore capable of exchange on the market, Lefebvre’s notion of 
abstract space underscores the exchangeability of individual pieces of space considered 
in isolation from their qualitative properties, natural features, and social meanings. Con-
crete space and abstract space are two aspects of the same phenomenon, either of which 
may be emphasized in a given social context. As Stanek (2011: 145) explains, “When 
Lefebvre claimed that abstract space is becoming ‘true in practice,’ he did not argue that 
concrete space vanishes but rather registered a preponderance of abstract space in eco-
nomic, social, and everyday life practices.” 
As the exchange-value character of space acquires greater social meaning and mate-
rial force, different component parts of space become increasingly interchangeable. In 
legal parlance, a commodity whose individual units are capable of mutual substitution 
is said to have the property of fungibility. Money, gold, and crude oil are fungible assets 
because any given quantity of each can be exchanged for any other equal quantity. Cor-
respondingly, the hypothetical state in which any place is replaceable by any other might 
be called fungible space. Whereas Lefebvre’s notion of abstract space refers to a whole 
suite of spatial practices “characterized by an isolation of functions, practices, and 
ideas” (Stanek, 2011: 142), fungibility diagnoses one specific implication of abstract 
space—the possibility of substituting one place for another. At the same time, it signals 
one of the social practices by which abstract space is brought into being: the enrollment 
of places into relations of substitution. 
While a state of absolute spatial fungibility—implying the perfect interchangeability 
of all places—is impossible, it figures throughout the history of capitalism as an orien-
tation or horizon. This tendency is especially pronounced in the world of commercial 
exchange and global commodity chains, as Lefebvre (1991: 341) himself noted: 
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Chains of commodities (networks of exchange) are constituted and articulated on a 
world scale: transportation networks, buying- and selling-networks (the circulation 
of money, transfers of capital). Linking commodities together in virtually infinite 
numbers, the commodity world brings in its wake certain attitudes towards space, 
certain actions upon space, even a certain concept of space. Indeed, all the commod-
ity chains, circulatory systems and networks, connected on high by Gold, the god of 
exchange, do have a distinct homogeneity. Exchangeability, as we have seen, implies 
interchangeability. 
The fungible character of space in capitalist commodity circuits has been amplified 
by recent developments in logistics. The widespread adoption of the standardized ship-
ping container, for example, has made it possible to move freight through multiple 
modes of transport without needing to unpack and repack it at each transfer point. 
Containerization and intermodalism have cheapened and accelerated the movement of 
goods, giving shippers and carriers unprecedented flexibility in their routing decisions. 
By reducing inland transport costs, they have also eroded seaports’ monopolies over 
their traditional hinterlands, leaving ports more vulnerable to being expunged from the 
network (Hesse, 2013). In North America, the development of a robust intermodal sys-
tem means that a significant share of imported freight is now considered “discretion-
ary”—that is, not tied to a particular port of entry. Meanwhile, global shipping lines 
have reorganized their service networks according to a hub-and-spoke model linked to-
gether by transshipment, or ship-to-ship transfer. Because transshipment activity is not 
tied to a specific location, it can easily be relocated to any number of ports in the same 
region. 
If these technological and organizational changes have accentuated the fungible 
quality of space in the logistics network, just as important have been the conceptual 
shifts that gave rise to the new business science of logistics management. As Cowen 
(2014) shows, the ascendancy of total-cost analysis and “systems thinking” in the 1960s 
opened up new ways of quantifying the spaces of the supply chain. The models used by 
logistics analysts treat location and distance as endogenous variables, data points to be 
measured and manipulated with an eye to maximizing profits across the entire cycle of 
production and distribution. Advances in computing power have enabled firms to 
quickly assess the financial implications of using an alternative route, port, carrier, or 
mode of transportation, encouraging them to treat space in terms of pure exchange 
value. Maersk Line’s decision to divert container services from the Panama Canal to the 
Suez, resulting in the bizarre map shown above, is one manifestation of this spatial cal-
culus. 
Notably, the heightened substitutability of places within today’s logistics chains 
means that not every actor in the network is on an equal footing. Those whose assets 
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are relatively fixed in place, like ports, canals, railroads, and airports, must vie for busi-
ness from relatively mobile actors, like shipping lines, airlines, and freight forwarders, 
as well as the manufacturers and retailers that employ them to move cargo. In practice, 
it is this second group, with their weak ties to place, who incite the drive toward fungi-
bility in the logistics network. Footloose shippers and carriers, insofar as they can flex-
ibly reroute shipments or reshape their service networks, can foment rivalries among 
place-bound actors in order to extract lower rates and other advantages. Global ship-
ping lines, for instance, can and do use the threat of diverting cargo in order to play port 
authorities off against one another in negotiations (Fowler, 2006). This competitive dy-
namic promotes a race to the bottom among ports, driving down local revenues, envi-
ronmental standards, and wages and working conditions on the docks. 
The spatial practices of mobile actors within the logistics network—underpinned by 
processes of standardization, calculation, and optimization—are therefore a potent 
manifestation of capitalism’s tendency to render space fungible. The ease with which 
footloose shippers and carriers can swap out places within corporate supply chains sets 
the stage for intense rivalries among geographically embedded actors to attract mobile 
cargo flows. Yet it is the efforts of this latter group that make such spatial substitutions 
possible in the first place. For not just any locality can insert itself into the logistics 
network: a place’s competitiveness depends on specific local conditions whose fulfill-
ment requires active and ongoing work. In this sense, the tendency toward spatial fun-
gibility is accompanied by, and has as its very condition, an opposing movement toward 
geographical specificity. In the next two sections, I explore how this dialectic has played 
out in the dynamics surrounding the expansion of the Panama Canal, an infrastructure 
project that has had reverberations throughout the Americas. 
Shifting Trade Routes: The Panama Canal Expansion and the “Battle of the Ports” 
On 26 June 2016, Panamanian authorities unveiled the first major upgrade to the coun-
try’s famed canal since its inauguration in 1914. The Panama Canal expansion project—
completed almost two years behind schedule and hundreds of millions of dollars over 
budget—involved outfitting the 77-kilometer waterway with a third set of locks and 
wider, deeper navigation channels. The canal’s new shipping lane can accommodate 
vessels carrying more than 14,000 containers, almost three times the capacity of the 
largest ships that could previously use the route. 
Within Panama, the expansion project enjoyed strong public support, having been 
approved by a wide majority of voters in a 2006 referendum. The Panama Canal Au-
thority (ACP, by its Spanish initials), the government agency responsible for the water-
way, had claimed that the upgrade was needed for three main reasons. First, the canal 
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was quickly nearing its maximum capacity. Traffic on the world’s oceans has quadru-
pled since 1992, putting increased pressure on global shipping lanes (Tournadre, 2014). 
As a consequence, vessels were regularly waiting up to 10 days to enter the Panama 
Canal (Knight, 2008). Second, the waterway was at risk of becoming obsolete owing to 
rapid growth in the size of cargo ships since the 1970s. Over 55% of the world’s sea-
borne containerized freight is now carried on “post-Panamax” vessels, so named be-
cause they are too big to fit through the canal’s original locks (DSF, 2014). A third 
impetus came from global shifts in the geographies of commodity production. Since the 
1980s, the offshoring of manufacturing, particularly to China, has resulted in a dramatic 
expansion of Asia–North America trade. As noted earlier, the Panama Canal had long 
been the preferred route for shippers moving Asian-produced goods to the large con-
sumer populations of the North American East Coast, but by the turn of the century it 
was facing mounting competition from two alternative routes. One was the North 
American intermodal system, or “land bridge,” by which containers are shipped across 
the Pacific, unloaded at deepwater ports along the US or Canadian West Coast, and 
then hauled eastward by train. The second threat to Panama was from the Suez Canal. 
Especially as manufacturing has migrated westward from China to low-wage countries 
on the Indian subcontinent, some shippers have begun routing Eastern Seaboard–bound 
cargoes through the Suez Canal and across the Atlantic. 
For these reasons, the ACP warned, Panama’s relevance as a global shipping lane 
was in jeopardy. The canal authority’s 2006 master plan used the word competitividad 
(competitiveness) 44 times, driving home the imperative of ensuring the waterway’s con-
tinued importance as a strategic route for maritime trade (ACP, 2006). In advance of 
the referendum, the ACP promoted the expansion project to Panamanian voters through 
a well-funded marketing campaign that made emotional appeals to patriotism, national 
prosperity, and what one spokesperson for the project described in an interview as Pan-
ama’s “historical-geographical destiny as the crossroads of the world.” 
This was not the first time that changing transportation technologies and trading 
patterns had threatened Panama’s importance as a commercial route. In the early Span-
ish colonial era, merchants had used Panama as a transit point for silver being trans-
ported from Peru to Madrid; beginning in the seventeenth century, however, competi-
tion from other interoceanic routes led to a drop in traffic across the isthmus, 
contributing to a sustained period of economic decline in Panama (Maurer and Yu, 
2011). This process repeated itself in 1869, when the opening of the US Transcontinen-
tal Railroad undercut the value of a railway that had been operating across Panama 
since 1855. Panama’s relevance as a conduit of world trade is certain to come under 
threat again in the future as potential new routes, including a proposed canal through 
Nicaragua and the prospect of an ice-free Northwest Passage, loom on the horizon. 
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Considered in light of this history, the project to expand the Panama Canal is only 
the latest scheme to enhance the country’s attractiveness to international trade. Numer-
ous Panamanian industry and government representatives, in interviews, invoked the 
country’s turbulent history as a crossroads of global commerce and warned of the dan-
gers that could ensue if capital once again decided to shift trade to other routes. Indeed, 
in business and policy circles, Panama’s competitiveness as a maritime and logistics hub 
has become an existential concern. At the 2013 Panama Logistics Expo and the 2013 
Panama Free Zones Expo Forum, an anxiety about the country’s logistics performance 
permeated many of the speeches, with several presenters stressing Panama’s vulnerable 
position vis-à-vis the capricious shipping lines. For the executive director of the Georgia 
Tech Panama Logistics Innovation and Research Center, growing the country’s logistics 
sector was a matter not only of attracting ship traffic to the canal but of enticing carriers 
to conduct transshipment at Panama’s ports: 
Ports are pretty much, pretty much totally dependent on the shipping lines for trans-
shipment. And it’s really easy for the shipping lines to pick up their transshipment 
and move it somewhere else. We saw that happen in Singapore a few years ago. . . . 
We have some services now that have moved from going through the canal to going 
through the Suez Canal. So the shipping lines are a fairly fickle group. . . . They 
know where they think they can make the most money. So what has to happen is 
you have to make it attractive for them to make the most money by transshipping 
in Panama. And it’s not just the ports, and it’s not just the railroad, not just the 
trucking companies. Everybody who wants Panama to be a hub, who wants compa-
nies to come locate here to redistribute their products, need to do whatever they can 
to make the ports and the railroads a success with regard to transshipment. 
Motivating such warnings is the intensification of competition for transshipment activity 
in Central America and the Caribbean, as numerous countries in the region have an-
nounced deepwater port projects in hopes of becoming regional hubs for the large ships 
transiting the widened Panama Canal. 
But the impacts of the canal expansion reach far beyond Central America and the 
Caribbean. The ability to deploy larger, more cost-efficient ships through the waterway 
creates an incentive for some shippers and carriers to bypass ports on the West Coast of 
North America in favor of the all-water route via Panama to the Eastern Seaboard. The 
prospect of receiving these bigger ships and their bigger cargoes has sparked the entre-
preneurial imaginations of port authorities along the North American East Coast, trig-
gering what has been called a “battle of the ports” (CanagaRetna, 2010: 12; Spivak, 
2011). Almost every major seaport from Halifax to Houston has been dredging its har-
bor, installing bigger cranes, expanding terminals, or improving road and rail connec-
tions in a bid to attract post-Panamax vessels. The Port of Miami recently declared itself 
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“big ship ready” after deepening its navigation channel to 15 meters and building a new 
undersea tunnel for trucks. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is raising 
the deck of the Bayonne Bridge so that post-Panamax container ships can pass under-
neath it. Even smaller cities are entering the fray: Jacksonville, Florida, is debating a 
harbor-deepening project of its own, while investors in Sydney, Nova Scotia, have an-
nounced plans for a new deepwater port that would be able to handle the largest con-
tainer ships in the world. Farther inland, state highway departments and railroads are 
making improvements to handle additional truck and train traffic. In the United States 
alone, over the five years leading up to the opening of the widened canal, port authorities 
and their private-sector partners were planning to spend an estimated $46 billion on 
infrastructure (AAPA, 2012). 
Exactly how much was at stake in this battle, however, was never clear. As work 
began on the Panama Canal expansion, industry analysts made wildly differing predic-
tions about how the project would affect North American shipping patterns. At one 
extreme were those who claimed the canal’s new locks would be a “game changer” (JLL, 
2011: 1; O’Reilly, 2012: 60). According to this view, ports on the US West Coast would 
suffer a swift and dramatic decline in cargo volumes as shippers rerouted up to 25% of 
containerized imports through the widened canal to ports on the East and Gulf Coasts 
(DSCA, 2008; Dynamar, 2008). At the other extreme were those who maintained that 
the canal expansion would have no perceptible impact on traffic flows. These commen-
tators noted that West Coast ports had already lost significant market share in recent 
years owing to congestion, labor unrest, and efforts by importers to diversify their sup-
ply chains (Prince, 2012; S. Smith, 2012; Weber Logistics, 2012). 
Despite this uncertainty, the prevailing orientation toward the canal expansion 
among East Coast port authorities has been one of unbridled optimism. In an interview, 
a Panama-based reporter who covers the shipping industry said that the ports’ expecta-
tions were overblown. “You have these big egos and big dreams. . . . Everyone’s just in 
this gold-rush mentality.” In his view, the competitive structure of port governance and 
the lack of federal coordination were resulting in wasteful public spending and redun-
dant infrastructure: 
You really only need three ports along the East/Gulf Coast that need to be big 
enough for these ships. And you have, what, fifteen ports all trying to get ready. . . . 
It’s just unreasonable. It’s just blowing a lot of money, I think. They’re going to get 
really, really burned. . . . There’s just this irrationality of thinking everyone wants to 
be that port. Whereas if you sort of get together at the government level and say, 
“OK, . . . three ports are going to benefit. Let’s pick them.” And no one is doing 
that. They’re saying everyone’s got to get bigger. 
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Perhaps the most dubious port scheme related to the Panama Canal is the Louisiana 
International Deep Water Gulf Transfer Terminal, a massive transshipment facility pro-
posed for construction near the mouth of the Mississippi River (http://www.ligtt.com). 
The investment firm promoting the $1.3 billion project, ABK Venture Group, is count-
ing not only on significant diversion of cargo through the Panama Canal but also on 
luring traffic away from the well-established Port of New Orleans, just 160 kilometers 
upriver. ABK has proposed to fund the terminal using money from immigrant inves-
tors—foreigners eligible to gain permanent US residency by investing at least $500,000 
in an American company (Kulisch, 2014). One New York–based transportation con-
sultant said that this “bizarre” financing scheme underscores the project’s profoundly 
speculative character, betraying “a lack of confidence that anybody else is going to pay 
for it.” He echoed the view that East Coast port interests have been too rosy in their 
expectations: “Everybody thinks that they’re going to get a piece of the action. . . . Peo-
ple are counting on big stuff to happen. But I think they’re going to be largely disap-
pointed.” Time will tell how many of these ports have placed losing bets. In the mean-
time, excess terminal capacity along the East Coast will benefit shipping lines at the 
expense of port authorities (Tirschwell, 2012). 
On the Pacific, meanwhile, the Panama Canal expansion is viewed as a threat. In an 
effort to maintain their dominance on transpacific container trades, West Coast port 
authorities and logistics interests have been pursuing competitive initiatives of their own. 
In Southern California, by far the leading gateway for Asian imports into North Amer-
ica, the Port of Long Beach is spending over a million dollars a day on a 10-year capital 
improvement program that includes the construction of a heavily automated container 
terminal and the replacement of a five-lane bridge with a wider, higher span. Union 
Pacific and BNSF, the two major railroads serving the western United States, have like-
wise stepped up their game in recent years, double-tracking their mainlines between Los 
Angeles and Chicago and building intermodal rail hubs in inland destinations like Mem-
phis and Kansas City. 
In Southern California, efforts to make the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 
competitive with the enlarged Panama Canal can be understood as part of a larger re-
gional strategy to promote goods-movement and logistics activities in the wake of dec-
ades of deindustrialization and the loss of white-collar employment (see De Lara, 2012). 
A key player in that agenda is the Southern California Association of Governments 
(SCAG), the metropolitan governance organization responsible for drawing up compre-
hensive freight-movement plans for the region. Particularly since the 2007–9 recession, 
the agency has worked to impress on politicians and the public the importance of trade 
and logistics to Southern California’s economy. According to a transportation planner 
at SCAG, a significant diversion of cargo through the Panama Canal would represent a 
serious blow to the region’s well-being: 
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What does it mean for the local community? So if you see a lot of diversion, obvi-
ously that means jobs. It means tax revenues. It means just the general welfare of the 
city. And that awareness is really important, because a lot of times you don’t realize 
how you’re tied to the port. . . . There’s a lot of goods-movement-dependent indus-
tries that also generate a lot of jobs and revenue, not just logistics. So when we talk 
about losing that trade, it affects everybody throughout a number of industries. 
From this perspective, Southern California has little choice but to adopt a competi-
tive stance vis-à-vis the new Panama Canal. Maintaining and enlarging the stream of 
containers moving through the twin ports is seen as vital to the health and prosperity of 
the entire region. 
In 2010, this entrepreneurial outlook crystallized in a campaign called Beat the Ca-
nal (http://www.beatthecanal.com), founded by two well-connected industry veterans in 
direct response to the impending completion of the widened Panama Canal and the at-
tendant threat of cargo diversion. The initiative brought together the Ports of LA and 
Long Beach, BNSF Railway and Union Pacific Railroad, the International Longshore 
and Warehouse Union (ILWU), International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 
11, SCAG, and the Southern California Leadership Council. It also had the support of 
several prominent local politicians and the Los Angeles Times. The coalition cam-
paigned aggressively for several years to expedite the construction of more than 60 
freight-related infrastructure projects throughout the region, including port improve-
ments, the replacement of a congested at-grade rail crossing with a new railway over-
pass, and two proposed intermodal rail terminals. As a policy director at SCAG ex-
plained, a key objective of the campaign was to raise awareness about the importance 
of logistics to Southern California’s economy: 
We needed a little bit of a rallying cry, to be honest with you, to move it through. 
So the Beat the Canal was perfect, because it was a very tangible thing. Whether or 
not it is devastating to our local economy or whether we lose a little bit, we don’t 
really want to lose any. Right? So how do we think about what kind of investments 
we need to make, as a region and as a state, to ensure that we’re going to lose as 
little market share as possible? 
One of the founders of the Beat the Canal effort echoed this view, saying that the cam-
paign was a “war cry” intended to bring together the disparate actors who share a stake 
in the regional goods-movement system. As the campaign’s other founder explained, the 
Panama Canal project served as a powerful motivator: 
I put a lot of pressure on the port, and Port of LA kind of responded with a compet-
itive strategy, which they had never had. . . . Nobody was thinking about it. They 
thought, “What the hell are you talking about?” And I said, “You wait. We’re going 
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to start Beat the Canal.” They thought, “Which canal?” I said, “Panama.” . . . You 
have to understand, in Southern California, if you don’t pick a good enemy, we will 
pick each other as the enemy. So we’ve got to have an enemy everybody’ll agree to. 
Speaking in 2014, the same industry veteran pronounced the Beat the Canal cam-
paign a success. Thanks in part to construction delays in Panama, almost all the infra-
structure projects in the regional portfolio had been completed before the opening of the 
canal’s new locks. More importantly for him, the initiative had instilled a new entrepre-
neurial mindset in Southern California’s logistics stakeholders: 
A lot of people have gotten on board. Now they mention competition, the first thing 
out of their mouth is, “Yes, the Panama Canal.” . . . So we were very effective. It 
was an effective theme. 
The argument elaborated so far has suggested a fairly straightforward conception of 
fungible space. The ACP’s initiative to expand the Panama Canal in order to remain 
competitive with the Suez Canal and the North American land bridge points to the sub-
stitutability of paths (canals, oceans, railways) within the logistics network, while the 
project’s implications for North American cargo patterns highlight the substitutability 
of nodes (transshipment points, port gateways). The optimism and anxiety on the part 
of place-based actors in the container-shipping network are a testament to the flexible 
shape of today’s supply chains and the ease with which shippers and carriers can divert 
commodity flows to alternative routes. Yet the competitive activities of those spatially 
fixed actors—many of whom are going to considerable lengths to accommodate larger 
ships and more cargo—hint at the work entailed in making such geographic substitu-
tions possible. In the next section I explore some of the conditions of spatial fungibility 
in more detail. 
The Conditions of Fungibility 
Cargo owners and transportation providers take into account a range of considera-
tions—locational, technical, legal, cultural, economic, political—when making decisions 
about how and where to route goods flows. For place-bound actors seeking to attract 
logistics activities to their jurisdictions, satisfying these requirements entails considerable 
and ongoing effort. The discussion here touches on six conditions of fungibility in the 
container-shipping network: infrastructure, institutional and regulatory frameworks, 
network integration, place marketing, labor relations, and political climate. 
Among the fundamental preconditions of a place’s insertion into the logistics net-
work are the industry’s requirements for large-scale infrastructure, often in the form of 
speculative megaprojects involving considerable public investment. As Jaffee (2015: 
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790) notes, the provision of the appropriate infrastructure is a “necessary, but ultimately 
insufficient, condition for achieving the economic development objectives,” since there 
is no guarantee that ships will actually call at a port facility once it is built. In container 
shipping, the necessary infrastructure comprises waterside elements (navigation chan-
nels, breakwaters, bridge clearances) and landside elements (berths, container yards, 
cranes, road and rail connections), as well as the various components of the wider re-
gional logistics system (truck routes, intermodal rail terminals, warehouse space). De-
veloping these facilities often entails dramatic modifications to the natural environment 
and costly environmental impact studies, as in the case of land-reclamation or harbor-
dredging works. These circumstances favor port cities that already have the necessary 
infrastructural endowments. A communications officer at the Port of Long Beach was 
one of several informants who said that Southern California’s well-developed logistics 
infrastructure gives it a competitive edge over the East Coast: 
Just staying pace with economic growth is an issue at ports, because the investments 
are so big, and they take so long. . . . It’s one of our advantages that we have this 
network here. . . . When you ask about the Panama Canal and, “Oh, yeah. OK, let’s 
just deepen the harbor and bring in a new crane,” no, that’s not enough. 
The challenges do not end with the initial provision of the fixed capital. Ports face 
continual pressure to expand and modernize their facilities if they are to remain com-
petitive. This is particularly salient given the growing size of container ships. The con-
solidation of the industry around a handful of global carriers, the proliferation of vessel-
sharing alliances, and the growth of transshipment have all concentrated cargo onto 
increasingly large vessels. The Long Beach official elaborated on the challenges this trend 
poses for port regions: 
The thing that’s clearly come out of the recession is that everybody needs to be more 
productive, more cost effective in everything they do. And among the ways that the 
industry’s moving toward that is employing bigger and bigger ships, to reduce the 
unit costs. But that means that everybody in the supply chain has to deal with having 
that massive volume of cargo coming to your port or your rail yard or your ware-
house. . . . With each ship—and we’re fortunate we have deep waters—not only do 
the waters have to be deeper, but the channels have to be wider. And then, like I say, 
cranes have to be taller and reach out further. There’s so many improvements, and 
every improvement is a million here and a million there, and pretty soon you’re into 
a billion there and a billion there. 
Port-expansion schemes are rendered doubly speculative by the fact that infrastructure 
development is often subject to forces beyond local control. In the United States, harbor-
dredging projects must be approved by the US Army Corps of Engineers, and federal 
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funding appropriations then secured from Congress (Jaffee, 2015). With dozens of ports 
vying for limited resources, support is far from guaranteed. 
A second factor affecting a place’s attractiveness to mobile logistics actors is the local 
institutional and regulatory context. Such preoccupations have been central to logistics-
oriented development efforts in Panama. In recent years, officials and business leaders 
have formed a dizzying array of public, private, and public-private bodies to enhance 
the country’s position as a distribution and transshipment hub, including a Competi-
tiveness and Logistics Secretariat, a Logistics Cabinet, a National Logistics Council, and 
a Logistics Business Council (SCL, 2017). The national government and private sector 
are collaborating with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the 
Andean Development Corporation–Development Bank of Latin America. These supra-
national bodies have provided funding, facilitation, and technical support to assist in 
restructuring the country’s institutional and legal frameworks, developing infrastruc-
ture, and formulating a national logistics plan. The Panamanian government has also 
partnered with the Georgia Institute of Technology to create the Georgia Tech Panama 
Logistics Innovation and Research Center, which aims to improve the country’s logistics 
performance through research and education (http://www.gatech.pa). 
Logistics-based growth strategies face a third challenge in that the goods-movement 
network is not a seamlessly integrated system or a cohesive operational unit, as it is 
often depicted by the industry, but a fragmentary, unstable ensemble of physical and 
social infrastructures that are conceived, constructed, and managed by formally inde-
pendent actors. No central entity coordinates investment or operational decisions with 
an eye to the functioning of the system as a whole. Yet, as the Panama Canal expansion 
illustrates, different sites in the network are bound together in complex relations of con-
tingency and interdependence. The returns on the investments made by North American 
port authorities hinged on the timely completion of the canal project, as well as on the 
activities of rival ports. Likewise, the Panama Canal Authority’s ability to attract post-
Panamax ships to its new locks in June 2016 depended in part on whether terminals on 
the North American East Coast were ready to accept those larger vessels. The frag-
mented but interdependent character of transportation infrastructure thus creates con-
siderable uncertainty for logistics-oriented entrepreneurial schemes. 
Similar dynamics are at play at a smaller scale, where integration of the various ele-
ments of the regional freight network is an important factor in a place’s logistics com-
petitiveness. Speaking at a forum, Georgia Tech Panama’s executive director explained 
that the greatest obstacle to increasing transshipment activity in Panama was the lack of 
coordination among the country’s numerous port, rail, and truck operators: 
Integration of all these pieces is essential. They all belong to different entities, they’re 
all private, and so it’s not at all easy to get integration among these private entities. 
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In fact, it’s pretty surprising that they’re all working together to try to make this 
happen. I guess it’s not so surprising if you think about the fact that it’s in every-
body’s best interest. 
As he stressed, Panama’s highly favorable geographic location at the narrowest point 
between the two oceans was not enough to make it a successful cargo hub: “This takes 
a tremendous amount of work.” The fungibility of space, such statements make clear, 
has to be actively produced. 
That work may also involve promoting a place to logistics operators. In 2009, six 
US port authorities from Seattle to Long Beach partnered with BNSF and Union Pacific 
on a joint marketing arrangement called the US West Coast Collaboration. In the wake 
of the economic crisis and in anticipation of the expansion of the Panama Canal, the 
coalition worked to promote the advantages of the West Coast’s ports and intermodal 
system to shippers and carriers. Those benefits, repeatedly enumerated by interviewees, 
include naturally deep harbors, frequent vessel services, extensive rail and road infra-
structure, excellent maritime and inland connectivity, and abundant warehouse space. 
But the US West Coast Collaboration should also be situated against the backdrop of 
years of negative press, and diverted cargo, after a labor disruption in 2002 and severe 
gridlock during the 2004 holiday season cost retailers millions of dollars. In the first 
event, a dispute between the Pacific Maritime Association and some 7,000 members of 
the ILWU culminated in a lockout that shut down US West Coast ports for 10 days. The 
incident contributed to a widespread perception of labor militancy along the Western 
Seaboard. In the wake of these events, the industry collaboration sought to assure ship-
pers of the reliability of the West Coast ports, emphasizing their “proven track record” 
and “ample labor force” on its website. 
Indeed, labor relations are crucial to competitiveness in logistics, which puts a high 
value on reliability (Jaffee, 2010). After the US West Coast port lockout, retailers, ship-
ping lines, and port authorities came together to identify and develop alternate points 
of entry on the East and Gulf Coasts; the widening of the Panama Canal was viewed as 
a “critical component” of this strategy (CanagaRetna, 2010: 9). The Panama-based re-
porter described the lasting reputational damage done by the 2002 labor dispute: “That 
sticks with shippers. They remember that. And they don’t like the uncertainty. . . . I 
think these guys will be happy not to be on the West Coast.” As the canal expansion 
project neared completion, shipping lines used the threat of diverting cargo through 
Panama to exercise discipline over West Coast longshore workers (Zerolnick, 2012). By 
some reports, this strategy was effective, pushing dockworkers in Los Angeles and Long 
Beach to accept compromises in contract negotiations. As one industry consultant said, 
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the ILWU “has tempered its wage demands as these large ships threaten to disinterme-
diate that port, as a larger Panama Canal threatens to disintermediate that port, and as 
ports in Mexico threaten to disintermediate that port.” 
Finally, a crucial condition of spatial fungibility in the freight network is local polit-
ical support for logistics-based development (see Jaffee, 2015). The case of the Southern 
California International Gateway (SCIG), an intermodal rail facility proposed by BNSF 
Railway and the Port of Los Angeles, illustrates how community opposition can play a 
decisive role in shaping the larger logistics network. In 2005, BNSF announced a plan 
to replace its existing transfer yard, located some 30 kilometers north of the ports in the 
city of Commerce, with a new, larger terminal near the docks. The SCIG project was 
touted as a state-of-the-art, environmentally friendly facility that would create jobs, re-
duce congestion, and improve air quality, in part by eliminating more than 1.5 million 
truck trips from the busy I-710 freeway each year (Port of Los Angeles, 2013). In inter-
views, Southern California public officials and business interests consistently described 
the project as vital to maintaining the region’s economic competitiveness. Others disa-
greed. A total of seven different lawsuits were brought against BNSF and the port over 
the project. The breadth of opposition was unusual, with the litigants including the City 
of Long Beach, community and environmental groups, the Long Beach Unified School 
District, the South Coast Air Quality Management District, and transportation compa-
nies with business at the ports. The plaintiffs argued that SCIG would increase emis-
sions, noise, and truck traffic, harming the health of residents and schoolchildren in west 
Long Beach—a low-income, predominantly Latino community that is already home to 
a major rail yard. In 2016, a California superior court ruled in their favor, halting con-
struction on the $500 million SCIG project. In his decision, the judge said that BNSF 
and the Port of LA had failed to adequately assess the project’s environmental impacts. 
While the proponents have appealed the decision, grassroots environmental justice 
movements have dealt Southern California logistics interests a major blow in their cam-
paign to beat the Panama Canal and their larger strategy to increase the volume of cargo 
moving through the region. 
This analysis of the network of change and contestation surrounding the expansion 
of the Panama Canal undermines any simplistic notion of fungibility as a property that 
inheres in space itself. On the contrary, it illustrates the work—material, discursive, and 
affective—that goes into attracting fickle commodity flows and the economic activities 
associated with them. The substitutability of nodes and paths within the logistics net-
work is not a preexisting property of places themselves but a condition that is actively 
produced through concerted effort. To conclude, I consider what is at stake in these 
speculative ventures, highlighting the costs and risks of logistics-based growth schemes 




Throughout the Americas, the expansion of the Panama Canal has sparked a flurry of 
entrepreneurial activity on the part of place-based actors seeking to capture footloose 
freight flows and the economic benefits purportedly attached to them. The anxiety over 
logistics competitiveness and cargo diversion, the feverish pace of infrastructure expan-
sion, and the formation of novel alliances attest to the rising prominence of goods move-
ment in local, regional, and national growth strategies. At the same time, the circulation 
of commodities through global logistics systems binds places together in complex rela-
tions of interdependence, contingency, and risk. What are the prospects for localities 
seeking to insert themselves into these networks? 
I have argued that the heightened substitutability of places within the logistics net-
work has rendered supply chains highly unpredictable and intensified rivalries among 
geographically situated actors for footloose commodity flows. Together, the relative 
powerlessness of those actors vis-à-vis mobile capital, the industry’s requirements for 
large-scale infrastructure, and places’ vulnerability to forces beyond local control com-
bine to make logistics-based development a highly risky growth strategy. It is far from 
clear that these risks are outweighed by the rewards. Compared with schemes to attract 
conventional production or consumption activities, logistics-oriented growth strategies 
create little in the way of local economic benefits. Because most of the goods moved 
through a region are destined for somewhere else, they generate no local sales-tax reve-
nue. The benefit most frequently cited by boosters—jobs—is often vastly overstated 
(Jaffee, 2015). Moreover, because distribution networks can be easily reorganized, what 
payoffs do flow from such strategies tend to be ephemeral. 
The dubious and fleeting benefits of schemes to attract commodity flows must be 
weighed against those initiatives’ clear negative social, economic, and ecological im-
pacts. As place-based elites and officials go to growing lengths to capture cargo, the 
costs and risks are disproportionately borne by the most vulnerable actors in the net-
work. Studies suggest that the true casualties in the “battle of the ports” are not ports 
as such but the communities and workers who live and labor in the pathways of global 
trade (R. Smith et al., 2010; HIP, 2011; Hricko, 2012). These groups, who are dispro-
portionately poor and racialized, subsidize cheap shipping through stolen wages, pre-
carious work, environmental degradation, cumulative health impacts, and the dispos-
session of homes and resources. 
Paradoxically, then, the fantasy of smooth, frictionless circulation rests on moments 
of turbulence and upheaval. Yet the harms of the global logistics system have not gone 
unchallenged. The violence wrought by this contemporary form of capitalist abstraction 
has met with potent resistance at key crossroads of trade—places like Colón, Panama; 
Busan, South Korea; and Oakland, California. Such struggles serve as a reminder that 
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while the structural logic of interspatial competition exerts powerful coercive pressures, 
it does not unfold automatically or independently of people’s concrete actions. 
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